Welfare reducing licensing.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00513-4MaRDI QIDQ1864822zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ramon Faulí-Oller, Joel Sandonís

Publication date 23 March 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00513-4

zbMATH Keywords

Patent licensingTwo-part tariff contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cites work

• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099358 (Why is no real title available?)
• On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
• On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation

Cited in

(37)

• Licensing of a quality-improving innovation
• Privatization in the presence of patent licensing
• Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?
• Revenue royalties
• Profit-sharing licensing
• The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
• Technology licensing under product differentiation
• Welfare reducing vertical licensing in the presence of complementary inputs
• Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
• The choice of prices versus quantities under outsourcing
• Licensing with skill acquisition
• On the Markovian efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
• A comment on ``welfare reducing licensing
• Intra-brand patent licensing with inter-brand competition
• Technology licensing and innovation -- A correction on two-part tariff analysis
• Licensing and innovation: a comment
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals
• Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
• Unionized labor market and licensing by a monopolist
• Licensing under general demand and cost functions
• Technology licensing, R\&D and welfare
• Welfare effects of entry into international markets with licensing
• Technology licensing and collusion
• Upstream privatization and downstream licensing
• Licensing cost‐reducing innovations under supply function competition
• Impact of technology development costs on licensing form in a differentiated Cournot duopoly
• Comparing Bertrand and Cournot in mixed markets
• International licensing under an endogenous tariff in vertically-related markets
• Exclusive and non-exclusive licensing with shelving
• Environmental policy, licensing strategy, and social welfare
• Optimal patent licensing: from three to two part tariffs
• Welfare reducing licensing by an outside innovator
• Spillovers, licensing and welfare
• Technology licensing under optimal tax policy
• Location equilibrium with asymmetric firms: the role of licensing
• Royalty licensing

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