Licensing cost‐reducing innovations under supply function competition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6076793
DOI10.1111/BOER.12349zbMATH Open1530.91271OpenAlexW3159630982MaRDI QIDQ6076793FDOQ6076793
Authors: Ismail Saglam 
Publication date: 17 October 2023
Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12349
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
- Strategic supply function competition with private information
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- Welfare reducing licensing.
- On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets with Large Fixed Costs
- Royalty licensing
- Fee versus royalty reconsidered
- On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets
- Revenue royalties
Cited In (7)
- Licensing endogenous cost-reduction in a differentiated Stackelberg model
- Compulsory licenses in the pharmaceutical industry: pricing and R\&D strategies
- Licensing pricing discrimination and allocative efficiency about the Chinese dual-use defense technology under a military shareholding contract
- Technology licensing or cost‐reducing outsourcing? Game theoretical analysis on consumers' home bias effects and firms' optimal strategies
- The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
- License Fees in Oligopoly When Outside Innovator can Enter the Market: Two-Step Auction
- Impact of technology development costs on licensing form in a differentiated Cournot duopoly
This page was built for publication: Licensing cost‐reducing innovations under supply function competition
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6076793)
