License Fees in Oligopoly When Outside Innovator can Enter the Market: Two-Step Auction

DOI10.1142/S0219198920500036MaRDI QIDQ5012902zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Masahiko Hattori, Yasuhito Tanaka

Publication date 26 November 2021

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

entryoligopolylicensetwo-step auctioninnovating firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes

Cited in

(2)

• Selling patent rights and the incentive to innovate
• Vertical differentiation in oligopoly and license fees when outside innovator can enter the market: two-step auction

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