Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: General bargaining outcomes

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0130-9zbMath1155.91014MaRDI QIDQ999117

Naoki Watanabe, Shigeo Muto

Publication date: 30 January 2009

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp?action=repository_uri&item_id=18661

zbMATH Keywords

core; oligopoly; licensing; bargaining set; coalition structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

FEE VERSUS ROYALTY POLICY IN LICENSING THROUGH BARGAINING: AN APPLICATION OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION, Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments, The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees, Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: asymptotic results in a general Cournot market, Foreign investigations in the field of game-theoretic analysis of innovations, Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation, Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof, Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach

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