Technology licensing under product differentiation

DOI10.1007/S00712-021-00750-YMaRDI QIDQ2066676zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Neelanjan Sen, Saumya Kaul, Rajit Biswas

Publication date 14 January 2022

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00750-y

zbMATH Keywords

product differentiationCournotoligopolytechnology licensing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
• Licensing by fixed-fee and two-part tariff in a differentiated Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
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• Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?

Cites work

• A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies
• Cartel stability in advertising-intensive and R\&D-intensive industries
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• Intra-brand competition in a differentiated oligopoly
• Licensing of a quality-improving innovation
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• On licensing policies in Bertrand competition
• Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
• Revenue royalties: comment
• The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology
• Welfare reducing licensing.

Cited in

(14)

• More licensed technologies may make it worse: a welfare analysis of licensing vertically two-tier foreign technologies
• Licensing by fixed-fee and two-part tariff in a differentiated Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
• Technology licensing and collusion
• Collusion under product differentiation
• An analysis of technology licensing and parallel importation under different market structures
• Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?
• Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
• Optimal know-how transfers in licensing contracts
• Technology licensing, R\&D and welfare
• Merger under horizontal and vertical product differentiation
• Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals
• On the licensing of a technology with unknown use
• When to merge with a lower quality producer?
• Operational research models for green technology cross-licensing with known carbon quota trading prices

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