Technology licensing and collusion

DOI10.1111/IJET.12373MaRDI QIDQ6053642zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Neelanjan Sen, Arghya Dutta

Publication date 23 October 2023

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/111639/8/MPRA_paper_111639.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collusionCournot competitionprice competitiontechnology licensinggrim-trigger strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Technology licensing under product differentiation
• A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale
• Technology licensing, R\&D and welfare
• Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
• Licensing under general demand and cost functions

Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• Cartel stability under quality differentiation
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Technology licensing strategies for three cost-differential manufacturers
• The profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements
• Welfare reducing licensing.

Cited in

(4)

• A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale
• Technology licensing between rival firms in presence of asymmetric information
• On the licensing of a technology with unknown use
• Collusion under product differentiation

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