Collusion under product differentiation

DOI10.1007/S00712-023-00852-9MaRDI QIDQ6547032zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Neelanjan Sen, Urvashi Tandon, Rajit Biswas

Publication date 30 May 2024

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00712-023-00852-9

zbMATH Keywords

cartel stabilityCournot competitionhorizontal and vertical product differentiationwelfare

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Cartel stability under quality differentiation
• Cartel formation with quality differentiation
• When imperfect collution is profitable
• Cartel stability in advertising-intensive and R\&D-intensive industries

Cites work

• A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• Cartel stability in advertising-intensive and R\&D-intensive industries
• Cartel stability under quality differentiation
• Duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Firm interdependence in oligopolistic markets
• Merger under horizontal and vertical product differentiation
• On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
• Technology licensing and collusion
• Technology licensing under product differentiation
• The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
• When to merge with a lower quality producer?

Cited in

(3)

• Degree of product differentiation, antitrust enforcement and cartel stability
• Multimarket contact, cartel and product quality
• A theoretical analysis of cooperation incentives for non-mutually dependent sellers

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