When imperfect collution is profitable

DOI10.1007/BF01224738MaRDI QIDQ1601329zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Andrea Lofaro

Publication date 26 June 2002

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01224738

zbMATH Keywords

cartel stabilityimperfect collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cites work

• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1440256 (Why is no real title available?)
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
• Stable Cartels

Cited in

(16)

• A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion
• Cartel stability in advertising-intensive and R\&D-intensive industries
• Price or quantity in tacit collusion?
• Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels
• Cartel formation with quality differentiation
• Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players
• Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3860824 (Why is no real title available?)
• The punishment mechanism analysis of Cartel Alliance mechanism
• Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity
• The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
• On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels
• Measuring the incentive to collude: the vitamin cartels, 1990--99
• Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade
• Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry
• Collusion under product differentiation

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