When imperfect collution is profitable
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Recommendations
- Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488127
- Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
- On the feasibility of maximal collusion
- Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry
- Collusion Under Asymmetric Information
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1440256 (Why is no real title available?)
- A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
- Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
- Stable Cartels
Cited in
(14)- Price or quantity in tacit collusion?
- The punishment mechanism analysis of Cartel Alliance mechanism
- On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels
- Countervailing power? Collusion in markets with decentralized trade
- Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity
- Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels
- A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion
- Measuring the incentive to collude: the vitamin cartels, 1990--99
- Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3860824 (Why is no real title available?)
- Cartel formation with quality differentiation
- Collusion under product differentiation
- Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry
- Cartel size and collusive stability with non-capitalistic players
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