Imperfect collusion in monitored markets with free entry

DOI10.1007/s00712-023-00835-wzbMath1530.91342OpenAlexW4385622140MaRDI QIDQ6085584

Tu Anh Pham, Ludwig von Auer

Publication date: 12 December 2023

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-023-00835-w

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitygameoligopolysustainabilityleadershipcartel

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• A note on cartel stability and endogenous sequencing with tacit collusion
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• When imperfect collution is profitable
• Stable Cartels
• A Note on the Equivalence of the Conjectural Variations Solution and the Coefficient of Cooperation
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• COMPETITION POLICY AND CARTEL SIZE

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