Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions

DOI10.1007/S00712-015-0457-1zbMath1408.91094OpenAlexW2174862309MaRDI QIDQ1654023

Y. Aharonov

Publication date: 7 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-015-0457-1

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesprocurement auctionsimplicit collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic programming (90C39) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• First-best collusion without communication
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Optimal Auction Design
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion^*

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