Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2294653
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.053zbMath1441.91032OpenAlexW2989767527WikidataQ126647436 ScholiaQ126647436MaRDI QIDQ2294653
Publication date: 11 February 2020
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.053
Cites Work
- Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer
- Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
- Multiattribute electronic procurement using goal programming
- Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
- Analysis and design for multi-unit online auctions
- Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: the case of conservation contracts
- Emerging multiple issue e-auctions
- Configurable offers and winner determination in multi-attribute auctions
- Contingent payment auction mechanism in multidimensional procurement auctions
- Bidder collusion
- Post-objective determination of weights of the evaluation factors in public procurement tenders
This page was built for publication: Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement