Analysis and design for multi-unit online auctions

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.11.031zbMath1394.91179OpenAlexW2555901684MaRDI QIDQ1751766

Xianqiang Yang

Publication date: 25 May 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.11.031

zbMATH Keywords

posted pricelot sizeauctions/biddingonline auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic programming (90C39) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Optimal Design of Online Sequential Buy-Price Auctions with Consumer Valuation Learning ⋮ Quality manipulation and limit corruption in competitive procurement ⋮ Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice

Cites Work

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• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Buy prices in online auctions: Irrationality on the internet?
• Unnamed Item

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