Predicting bidders' willingness to pay in online multiunit ascending auctions: analytical and empirical insights

DOI10.1287/IJOC.1070.0247MaRDI QIDQ2901017zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ravi Bapna, Paulo Goes, Alok Gupta, Gilbert Karuga

Publication date 28 July 2012

Published in INFORMS Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a4723475ccbe178600db80184be2a470dae4f3b9

zbMATH Keywords

online auctionsdynamic-mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Analysis and design of business-to-consumer online auctions
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Cited in

(6)

• Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels
• Emotional Bidders—An Analytical and Experimental Examination of Consumers' Behavior in a Priceline-Like Reverse Auction
• The determinants of price in online auctions: more evidence from unbalanced panel data
• Dynamic lot-sizing in sequential online retail auctions
• Moving from data-constrained to data-enabled research: experiences and challenges in collecting, validating and analyzing large-scale e-commerce data
• Analysis and design for multi-unit online auctions

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