Predicting bidders' willingness to pay in online multiunit ascending auctions: analytical and empirical insights

DOI10.1287/IJOC.1070.0247zbMATH Open1243.91053OpenAlexW2008181656MaRDI QIDQ2901017FDOQ2901017

Authors: Ravi Bapna, Paulo Goes, Alok Gupta, Gilbert Karuga 

Publication date: 28 July 2012

Published in: INFORMS Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a4723475ccbe178600db80184be2a470dae4f3b9

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

online auctionsdynamic-mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (6)

• Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels
• Analysis and design for multi-unit online auctions
• The determinants of price in online auctions: more evidence from unbalanced panel data
• Moving from data-constrained to data-enabled research: experiences and challenges in collecting, validating and analyzing large-scale e-commerce data
• Dynamic lot-sizing in sequential online retail auctions
• Emotional Bidders—An Analytical and Experimental Examination of Consumers' Behavior in a Priceline-Like Reverse Auction

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