Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1461MaRDI QIDQ3398233zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael P. Wellman, Anna Osepayshvili, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Daniel M. Reeves

Publication date 26 September 2009

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/61930

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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• Bidding languages for auctions of divisible goods
• An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
• Bidding strategies for fantasy-sports auctions
• Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions
• Simultaneous Bidding with a Fixed Charge if Any Bid is Successful
• Preferences and Performance in Simultaneous First-Price Auctions: A Structural Analysis
• Addressing the exposure problem of bidding agents using flexibly priced options
• Multi-unit auctions with a stochastic number of asymmetric bidders
• Optimal strategies for simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substitutes
• Bidding agents for online auctions with hidden bids
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2080503 (Why is no real title available?)
• Predicting bidders' willingness to pay in online multiunit ascending auctions: analytical and empirical insights
• Designing bidding strategies in sequential auctions for risk averse agents
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2006589 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions
• Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions

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