Designing bidding strategies in sequential auctions for risk averse agents

DOI10.3233/MGS-2010-0160zbMATH Open1213.91084OpenAlexW2123789916MaRDI QIDQ3082129FDOQ3082129

Authors: Valentin Robu, Han La Poutré 

Publication date: 9 March 2011

Published in: Multiagent and Grid Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3233/mgs-2010-0160

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40)

Cited In (5)

• A study on time constraints of multi-attribute sequential auction
• Addressing the exposure problem of bidding agents using flexibly priced options
• Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
• Designing sniping agents
• Sequential procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers

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