Sequentially optimal auctions
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Publication:1357405
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0529zbMath0872.90030MaRDI QIDQ1357405
R. Preston McAfee, Daniel R. Vincent
Publication date: 10 June 1997
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1104.pdf
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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