Ordering sellers in sequential auctions

DOI10.1007/S10058-013-0152-ZMaRDI QIDQ2254233zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Qiang Gong, Xu Tan, Yiqing Xing

Publication date 4 February 2015

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0152-z

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyoptimal mechanismorderreserve pricessequential auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Sequential auctions with decreasing reserve prices
• Sequentially optimal auctions
• Sequential auctions and externalities
• Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
• Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions
• Microeconomic theory
• Optimal Auction Design
• Sequentially optimal auctions

Cited in

(6)

• Bottom-fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions
• Sequential auctions with decreasing reserve prices
• The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions
• Sequential auctions and externalities
• How to sell in a sequential auction market
• An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem

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