Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions
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Publication:1877158
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.002zbMath1070.91015MaRDI QIDQ1877158
Bernard Caillaud, Claudio Mezzetti
Publication date: 16 August 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.002
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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