First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model
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Publication:2268137
DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0428-7zbMath1185.91090MaRDI QIDQ2268137
J. Philipp Reiß, Jens Robert Schöndube
Publication date: 10 March 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0428-7
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B50: General equilibrium theory
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Cites Work
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