Implicit Cost Allocation and Bidding for Contracts

DOI10.1287/MNSC.36.9.1133zbMATH Open0707.90028OpenAlexW1987723707MaRDI QIDQ3489765FDOQ3489765

Authors: Susan I. Cohen, Martin Loeb 

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2142/29890

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zbMATH Keywords

indirect costsindependent private-values bidding modeloptimal cost allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cited In (6)

• Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: an experimental study
• The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners. A study based on field and laboratory data
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model
• Pricing in multiple-item procurement auctions with a common to all items fixed cost
• Bid calculation for construction projects: regulations and incentive effects of unit price contracts

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