Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.016zbMath1157.91339MaRDI QIDQ2373767

Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date: 16 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/2933

zbMATH Keywords

communication; auction; collusion; bid rotation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Efficient chip strategies in repeated games, Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors, Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions, Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer, Private monitoring in auctions, Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study, Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions, Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden, Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions, Bribing in second-price auctions

Cites Work

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