Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.07.016MaRDI QIDQ2373767zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date 16 July 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/2933

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcollusionauctionbid rotation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3365044 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
• On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Cited in

(28)

• Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
• Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
• Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions
• Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547873 (Why is no real title available?)
• Communication and efficiency in auctions
• The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions
• Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
• Collusion through communication in auctions
• Collusion through mediated communication in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring
• Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study
• Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
• Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
• Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer
• Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
• Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions
• Private monitoring in auctions
• First-best collusion without communication
• Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden
• Bribing in second-price auctions
• Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors
• Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1944103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Rotating credit collusion in repeated auctions with a single buyer and several sellers
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
• Algorithms - ESA 2003

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