Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2373767
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.016zbMath1157.91339MaRDI QIDQ2373767
Publication date: 16 July 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/2933
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Related Items
Efficient chip strategies in repeated games, Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors, Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions, Auctions and corruption: an analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer, Private monitoring in auctions, Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study, Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions, Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden, Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions, Bribing in second-price auctions
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
- Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions.
- Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- On Efficient Distribution with Private Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Collusion and Price Rigidity