Collusion through communication in auctions
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Publication:1691351
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.021zbMath1393.91071OpenAlexW2346302269MaRDI QIDQ1691351
Publication date: 16 January 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160229-145403385
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items
Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values, Confirmation bias with motivated beliefs, Should straw polls be banned?, The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions, Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
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