The Vulnerability of Auctions to Bidder Collusion*
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Publication:5850915
DOI10.1162/qjec.2009.124.2.883zbMath1186.91112OpenAlexW1998819958MaRDI QIDQ5850915
Leslie M. Marx, Robert C. Marshall
Publication date: 20 January 2010
Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c007e481b6a31e3d1588d54f3dc7cf3d4e9f0a12
Related Items (4)
Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions ⋮ Optimal implicit collusion in repeated procurement auctions ⋮ Collusion through communication in auctions ⋮ Bidder collusion at first-price auctions
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