Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.010zbMath1400.91234OpenAlexW2620168705MaRDI QIDQ2359391

Peter Troyan

Publication date: 28 June 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.010

zbMATH Keywords

signalingauctioncollusioninterdependent valuessecond-price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Speculation in procurement auctions ⋮ Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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