Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2359391
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.010zbMath1400.91234OpenAlexW2620168705MaRDI QIDQ2359391
Publication date: 28 June 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.010
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Bribing in first-price auctions
- Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Collusion through communication in auctions
- Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
- Bidder collusion
- Efficient collusion in optimal auctions
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Collusion in one-shot second-price auctions
- Bribing in second-price auctions
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
- Efficient Auctions
- Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
This page was built for publication: Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values