Speculation in procurement auctions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105692zbMath1528.91038arXiv2203.03044OpenAlexW4385144573MaRDI QIDQ6072238

Shanglyu Deng

Publication date: 12 October 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.03044

zbMATH Keywords

speculationprocurementacquisitionauction theorysupply reductionsupply withholding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Bribing in first-price auctions
• English auctions with resale: an experimental study
• Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
• Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions
• Auctions with speculators: an experimental study
• Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
• Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values
• Bribing in second-price auctions
• Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions

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