Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden
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Publication:2399670
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.03.004zbMath1394.91171OpenAlexW971514976MaRDI QIDQ2399670
Publication date: 24 August 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.03.004
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Cites Work
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
- Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
- A Multistage Model of Bargaining
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
- Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
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