Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
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Publication:1121185
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90126-9zbMath0673.90102OpenAlexW2036870450MaRDI QIDQ1121185
Steven A. Matthews, Andrew Postlewaite
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/744.pdf
bargainingtradingallocation rulesunmediated communicationequilibrium outcomestwo-person double auction
Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)
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