How naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.05.031MaRDI QIDQ1925910zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rene Saran

Publication date 27 December 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.031

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionefficiencynaive traderspreplay communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Bilateral trading with naive traders
• How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions

Cites work

• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Bilateral trading with naive traders
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions

Cited in

(3)

• Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
• Bilateral trading with naive traders
• How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games

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