The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
From MaRDI portal
Publication:707290
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2003.09.008zbMATH Open1181.91041OpenAlexW2082276583MaRDI QIDQ707290FDOQ707290
Authors: D. Kharzeev 
Publication date: 9 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.008
Recommendations
Cites Work
- A model of expertise
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Authority and Communication in Organizations
- Long Cheap Talk
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- Multistage Games with Communication
- Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
- Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
- Universal Mechanisms
- Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
Cited In (58)
- \textit{simple} mediation in a cheap-talk game
- Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
- The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders
- Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests
- Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
- Cheap talk with two-sided private information
- Competitive cheap talk
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Communication in bargaining over decision rights
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- Communication under language barriers
- Communication in Cournot oligopoly
- Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences
- Long persuasion games
- How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence
- Mediated talk: an experiment
- Intentional vagueness
- Comparative cheap talk
- Dynamic persuasion
- Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control
- A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
- Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Communication breakdown: consultation or delegation from an expert with uncertain bias
- Informational control and organizational design
- Persuasion and dynamic communication
- Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers
- Eliciting information from multiple experts
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships
- Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response
- A mathematical model of communication with reputational concerns
- Goodwill in communication
- Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
- A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space
- Dynamic learning and strategic communication
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Professional advice
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
- Confidence and competence in communication
- Random authority
- Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games
- Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk
- A model of expertise
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
- Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case
- Communication via a strategic mediator
- Incomplete contracts versus communication
- Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication
- MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
- Designing communication hierarchies
- Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
- Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games
- Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
- Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns
- Cheap talk with private signal structures
- Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
- Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
This page was built for publication: The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q707290)
