The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.008zbMath1181.91041OpenAlexW2082276583MaRDI QIDQ707290

Publication date: 9 February 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.008

zbMATH Keywords

communication information cheap talk experts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (49)

Strategic gradual learning and information transmission ⋮ Dynamic persuasion ⋮ A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Goodwill in communication ⋮ Comparative cheap talk ⋮ Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control ⋮ Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk ⋮ Persuasion and dynamic communication ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers ⋮ Dynamic strategic information transmission ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games ⋮ Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult ⋮ Cheap talk with prior-biased inferences ⋮ Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games ⋮ Mediated talk: an experiment ⋮ Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations ⋮ The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders ⋮ Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests ⋮ Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games ⋮ A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games ⋮ Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information ⋮ Intentional vagueness ⋮ Communication in bargaining over decision rights ⋮ RANDOM AUTHORITY ⋮ Communication under language barriers ⋮ Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk ⋮ Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication ⋮ Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns ⋮ Eliciting private information with noise: the case of randomized response ⋮ Long persuasion games ⋮ How to talk to multiple audiences ⋮ Informational control and organizational design ⋮ Communication via a strategic mediator ⋮ Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case ⋮ Mediation, arbitration and negotiation ⋮ MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES ⋮ Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships ⋮ Designing communication hierarchies ⋮ Cheap talk with private signal structures ⋮ Incomplete contracts versus communication ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types ⋮ Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders ⋮ An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk ⋮ Confidence and competence in communication ⋮ Competitive cheap talk

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