Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6176740
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.06.008zbMath1521.91039arXiv2004.01910MaRDI QIDQ6176740
Dries Vermeulen, Janos Flesch, Aditya Aradhye, Mathias Staudigl
Publication date: 23 August 2023
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.01910
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
- On the value of optimal stopping games
- A two-person game of information transmission
- Who solved the secretary problem
- Dynamic persuasion
- Dynamic sender-receiver games
- Optimal dynamic information provision
- Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
- Some dynamics of signaling games
- Learning to Network
- Multistage Games with Communication
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Long Cheap Talk