Strategic Information Transmission
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Publication:3958389
DOI10.2307/1913390zbMath0494.94007OpenAlexW2160003140WikidataQ56502972 ScholiaQ56502972MaRDI QIDQ3958389
Joel Sobel, Vincent P. Crawford
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913390
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
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