Noisy signaling: theory and experiment
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Publication:645647
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.04.006zbMATH Open1274.91092OpenAlexW2106517091MaRDI QIDQ645647FDOQ645647
Authors: Thomas de Haan, Theo Offerman, Randolph Sloof 
Publication date: 10 November 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.006
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Cites Work
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
- Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
- Commitment and observability in games
- Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
- Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
- Experience-weighted attraction learning in coordination games: Probability rules, heterogeneity, and time-variation
- Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
- Theories of Learning in Games and Heterogeneity Bias
- Games with imperfectly observable commitment
- Closure Policy when Bank Inspection Can Be Manipulated *
- Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
- Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
Cited In (6)
- Testing under information manipulation
- Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
- Voluntary disclosure of private information and unraveling in the market for lemons: an experiment
- Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: signaling under behavioral diversity
- Signal extraction: experimental evidence
- Learning with noiseless information and payoff-relevant signals
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