Theories of Learning in Games and Heterogeneity Bias

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Publication:3428552

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00704.xzbMath1138.91013OpenAlexW2125990089MaRDI QIDQ3428552

Nathaniel T. Wilcox

Publication date: 27 March 2007

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00704.x




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