Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.12.008zbMATH Open1437.91076OpenAlexW3000460964WikidataQ126402756 ScholiaQ126402756MaRDI QIDQ2178018FDOQ2178018
Authors: Erik Mohlin, Robert Östling, Joseph Tao-yi Wang 
Publication date: 7 May 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.008
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