Theoretical approaches to lowest unique bid auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2014.02.011MaRDI QIDQ2452209zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, Makoto Shimoji

Publication date 2 June 2014

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.02.011

zbMATH Keywords

computationweak dominanceauction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions
• Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
• An experiment on lowest unique integer games
• Nash Equilibria in a Sealed Bid Auction
• On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions

Cites work

• Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions
• Large Poisson games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory

Cited in

(7)

• Multiagent model and mean field theory of complex auction dynamics
• Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions
• Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games
• Exact asymptotics and continuous approximations for the lowest unique positive integer game
• Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
• An experiment on lowest unique integer games
• Lowest unique bid auctions with population uncertainty

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