Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:1668178)
Recommendations
- Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
- Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
- An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions
- On the efficiency of the first price auction
- Theoretical approaches to lowest unique bid auctions
- Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
- Efficient Auctions
- Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
- Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions
Cited in
(8)- Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
- Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions
- Special issue on ambiguity and strategic interactions in honor of Jürgen Eichberger
- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
- The effectiveness of low price matching in mitigating the competitive pressure of low friction electronic markets
- Theoretical approaches to lowest unique bid auctions
- Price reveal auctions
- A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
This page was built for publication: Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1668178)