Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.02.012MaRDI QIDQ1668178zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jürgen Eichberger, Dmitri Vinogradov

Publication date 3 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://repository.essex.ac.uk/16153/1/1-s2.0-S0165176516300337-main.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyselling mechanismunmatched bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions

Cited in

(8)

• Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
• Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions
• Special issue on ambiguity and strategic interactions in honor of Jürgen Eichberger
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• The effectiveness of low price matching in mitigating the competitive pressure of low friction electronic markets
• Theoretical approaches to lowest unique bid auctions
• Price reveal auctions
• A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share

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