Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions

DOI10.1137/1.9781611973105.43zbMath1422.91289OpenAlexW1585513689MaRDI QIDQ5741751

Silvio Micali, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg, Pablo D. Azar

Publication date: 15 May 2019

Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973105.43

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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