Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2019.02.007zbMATH Open1417.91252OpenAlexW2921634930MaRDI QIDQ2425155FDOQ2425155

Authors: Nikolaus Schweizer, Nora Szech 

Publication date: 26 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.02.007

Recommendations

• Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity
• On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
• Optimal pricing for MHR distributions

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic ordersauctionsalgorithmic mechanism designmonotone hazard rate\(\rho\)-concavityMyerson regularity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Life distributions. Structure of nonparametric, semiparametric, and parametric families.
• Statistical Size Distributions in Economics and Actuarial Sciences
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stochastic orders
• Game theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Periodic Pricing of Seasonal Products in Retailing
• Order Statistics
• Auctions with entry
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Ethically flexible Gini indices for income distributions in the continuum
• Optimal Auction Design
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions
• Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• A Note on Probability Distributions with Increasing Generalized Failure Rates
• Technical Note—New Results Concerning Probability Distributions with Increasing Generalized Failure Rates
• Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information
• Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity
• Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
• Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium
• Optimal advertising of auctions
• Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition.
• Relationships Among Three Assumptions in Revenue Management
• Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
• Simple, optimal and efficient auctions
• Inequalities for Linear Combinations of Order Statistics from Restricted Families
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions
• Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers
• The sample complexity of revenue maximization
• Limiting Price Discrimination when Selling Products with Positive Network Externalities

Cited In (4)

• Auction timing and market thickness
• Quantile analysis of ``hazard-rate game models
• Optimal sales limits in multi-stage bargain sales with shifts of customers
• Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity

This page was built for publication: Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2425155)