Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
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Publication:2190389
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_11zbMath1443.91167arXiv1810.00800OpenAlexW2892403580MaRDI QIDQ2190389
Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Kèyù Zhü
Publication date: 18 June 2020
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.00800
Related Items (3)
Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms ⋮ Optimal pricing for MHR distributions ⋮ On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions
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