On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions
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Publication:777967
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_17zbMATH Open1435.91097OpenAlexW2991411207MaRDI QIDQ777967FDOQ777967
Authors: Yaonan Jin, Weian Li, Qi Qi 
Publication date: 30 June 2020
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_17
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
- Optimal Auction Design
- Revenue maximization with a single sample
- Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
- Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables
- Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
- The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
- Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
- Making the Most of Your Samples
- Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
- Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
- Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
- The sample complexity of auctions with side information
- A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
Cited In (8)
- Tight revenue gaps among multiunit mechanisms
- Applications of \(\alpha \)-strongly regular distributions to Bayesian auctions
- Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
- A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
- Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
- Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
- Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition
- Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
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