On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_17MaRDI QIDQ777967zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yaonan Jin, Weian Li, Qi Qi

Publication date 30 June 2020

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_17

zbMATH Keywords

approximation ratiosecond-price auctionanonymous pricingMyerson auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
• Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
• Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
• Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
• Simple and nearly optimal multi-item auctions

Cites work

• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables
• Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
• Making the Most of Your Samples
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
• Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
• The sample complexity of auctions with side information
• Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
• Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms

Cited in

(8)

• Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
• Tight revenue gaps among multiunit mechanisms
• Applications of \(\alpha \)-strongly regular distributions to Bayesian auctions
• Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
• A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
• Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
• Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
• Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition

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