On the approximability of simple mechanisms for MHR distributions

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_17zbMATH Open1435.91097OpenAlexW2991411207MaRDI QIDQ777967FDOQ777967

Weian Li, Qi Qi, Yaonan Jin

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_17

zbMATH Keywords

approximation ratiosecond-price auctionanonymous pricingMyerson auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• Revenue maximization with a single sample
• Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
• Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables
• Optimal pricing for MHR distributions
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
• Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
• Making the Most of Your Samples
• Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
• Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
• Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms
• The sample complexity of auctions with side information
• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design

Cited In (2)

• A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
• Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms

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