The sample complexity of auctions with side information
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Publication:5361849
DOI10.1145/2897518.2897553zbMath1375.91092arXiv1511.02296OpenAlexW2266969817MaRDI QIDQ5361849
Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhi-Yi Huang
Publication date: 29 September 2017
Published in: Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.02296
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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