Learning in Repeated Auctions
DOI10.1561/2200000077zbMath1491.68168arXiv2011.09365OpenAlexW4212827115MaRDI QIDQ5863991
Thomas Nedelec, Clément Calauzènes, Noureddine El Karoui, Vianney Perchet
Publication date: 3 June 2022
Published in: Foundations and Trends® in Machine Learning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.09365
statistical learning theoryoperations researchalgorithmic game theorydesign and analysis of algorithmsgame-theoretic learning
Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to computer science (68-02) Online algorithms; streaming algorithms (68W27) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)
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