Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization
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Publication:5212807
DOI10.1145/3313276.3316325zbMath1433.91049arXiv1904.04962OpenAlexW3100022481MaRDI QIDQ5212807
Xinzhi Zhang, Chenghao Guo, Zhi-Yi Huang
Publication date: 30 January 2020
Published in: Proceedings of the 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.04962
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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