Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
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Publication:4978029
DOI10.1145/3055399.3055427zbMath1370.68252arXiv1610.09976OpenAlexW2544285741MaRDI QIDQ4978029
Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Noam Nisan
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.09976
Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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