Uniformly bounded regret in the multisecretary problem

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Publication:5113899

DOI10.1287/STSY.2018.0028zbMATH Open1446.60033arXiv1710.07719OpenAlexW2766449057WikidataQ127302489 ScholiaQ127302489MaRDI QIDQ5113899FDOQ5113899


Authors: Alessandro Arlotto, Itai Gurvich Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 18 June 2020

Published in: Stochastic Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: In the secretary problem of Cayley (1875) and Moser (1956), n non-negative, independent, random variables with common distribution are sequentially presented to a decision maker who decides when to stop and collect the most recent realization. The goal is to maximize the expected value of the collected element. In the k-choice variant, the decision maker is allowed to make kleqn selections to maximize the expected total value of the selected elements. Assuming that the values are drawn from a known distribution with finite support, we prove that the best regret---the expected gap between the optimal online policy and its offline counterpart in which all n values are made visible at time 0---is uniformly bounded in the the number of candidates n and the budget k. Our proof is constructive: we develop an adaptive Budget-Ratio policy that achieves this performance. The policy selects or skips values depending on where the ratio of the residual budget to the remaining time stands relative to multiple thresholds that correspond to middle points of the distribution. We also prove that being adaptive is crucial: in general, the minimal regret among non-adaptive policies grows like the square root of n. The difference is the value of adaptiveness.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.07719




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