A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design

DOI10.1145/2897518.2897645zbMath1377.91104arXiv1812.01577OpenAlexW2409015594MaRDI QIDQ5361891

Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg

Publication date: 29 September 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.01577

zbMATH Keywords

revenuesimple and approximately optimal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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