Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-35389-6_11zbMATH Open1435.91059arXiv1909.10584OpenAlexW2990226152MaRDI QIDQ776253FDOQ776253

Authors: Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg 

Publication date: 30 June 2020

Abstract: Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms. This paper applies this same methodology to a close cousin of traditional mechanism design, one which shares conceptual and technical elements with its more mature relative: the burgeoning field of persuasion. The dual perspective permits us to analyze optimal persuasion schemes both in settings which have been analyzed in prior work, as well as for natural generalizations which we are the first to explore in depth. Most notably, we permit combining persuasion policies with payments, which serve to augment the persuasion power of the scheme. In both single and multi-receiver settings, as well as under a variety of constraints on payments, we employ duality to obtain structural insights, as well as tractable and simple characterizations of optimal policies.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.10584

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
• Optimal Auction Design
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• A model of Bayesian persuasion with transfers
• Private Bayesian persuasion
• On the competition complexity of dynamic mechanism design
• The value of information concealment
• Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
• Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• Constrained signaling in auction design

Cited In (8)

• Constrained Information Design
• Motivating dualities
• The secretary recommendation problem
• Algorithms for persuasion with limited communication
• Bayesian persuasion: reduced form approach
• Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
• Competition in persuasion: an experiment
• A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem

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