Constrained Signaling in Auction Design
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Publication:5384061
DOI10.1137/1.9781611973402.99zbMath1435.91096arXiv1302.4713OpenAlexW2951916374MaRDI QIDQ5384061
Aaron Roth, Shaddin Dughmi, Nicole Immorlica
Publication date: 20 June 2019
Published in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1302.4713
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
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Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. ⋮ Noisy persuasion ⋮ On the hardness of designing public signals ⋮ The Complexity of Contracts ⋮ Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality ⋮ Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
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