On Optimal Rules of Persuasion

DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00551.xzbMath1141.91338OpenAlexW4362233844MaRDI QIDQ5475060

Ariel Rubinstein, Jacob Glazer

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00551.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) 2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (32)

Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Hard evidence and mechanism design ⋮ Message exchange games in strategic contexts ⋮ Persuasion and dynamic communication ⋮ Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification ⋮ Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission ⋮ Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment ⋮ Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games ⋮ When to ask for an update: timing in strategic communication ⋮ Language Games ⋮ How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence ⋮ LEARNING AND EVIDENCE IN INSURANCE MARKETS ⋮ Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion ⋮ The winner's curse: conditional reasoning and belief formation ⋮ Strategic argumentation ⋮ Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions ⋮ A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research ⋮ Problems and results in extremal combinatorics. II ⋮ Strategic interpretations ⋮ Implementation via rights structures ⋮ EFFECTIVE PERSUASION ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Mechanism design with partial state verifiability ⋮ Conversation and Games ⋮ Simple versus rich language in disclosure games ⋮ Evidence reading mechanisms ⋮ Strategic communication with reporting costs ⋮ Experimental design to persuade

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