Strategic interpretations

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105192zbMATH Open1458.91042OpenAlexW4249805999MaRDI QIDQ1995331FDOQ1995331

Authors: Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler, Heidi C. Thysen 

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105192

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zbMATH Keywords

model misspecificationbounded rationalitypersuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
• Manipulative auction design
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Language barriers
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Complex Questionnaires
• Communication under language barriers
• A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding

Cited In (6)

• Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules
• Strategic Vagueness, and Appropriate Contexts
• Strategic consensus
• Shannon meets Myerson: information extraction from a strategic sender
• Modeling players with random ``data access
• Meaningful talk

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