Strategic interpretations

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2021.105192MaRDI QIDQ1995331zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler, Heidi C. Thysen

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105192

zbMATH Keywords

model misspecificationbounded rationalitypersuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
• Strategic communication with minimal verification
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Endogenous ambiguity and rational miscommunication

Cites work

• A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding
• Communication under language barriers
• Complex Questionnaires
• Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics
• Language barriers
• Manipulative auction design
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(6)

• Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules
• Strategic Vagueness, and Appropriate Contexts
• Strategic consensus
• Shannon meets Myerson: information extraction from a strategic sender
• Modeling players with random ``data access
• Meaningful talk

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